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EXPLANATORY NOTE

No Addendum has been included in this Brief because there
is nothing of significance that could be attached to satisfy this
requirement. This matter went to the Supreme Court on Appellant's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to allow the parties
to brief the question of why the appeal should not have been
dismissed.

There is no lower court opinion or decision to be

reviewed. The Court of Appeals initiated the dismissal discussions
at the appellate level, and the parties dealt with this topic in
previous briefs and memoranda.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RICHARD W. VON HAKE, Trustee
of the Von Hake 1987 Trust,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 920643-CA
vs.
HARRY EDWARD THOMAS, aka
ED THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS OPINIONS
The Utah Court of Appeals entered an opinion in the above
matter on August 10, 1993. The Court ruled that the appeal should
be dismissed because defendant had failed to serve a thirty-day
jail sentence imposed upon him for Contempt of Court in 1984.
Appellant then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to have that
ruling reviewed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court partially
granted the Petition by an unpublished minute entry on December 2,
1993, and the matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals with
instructions to allow the parties to brief the question of why the
appeal should not have been dismissed.

The Court of Appeals has

asked the parties to discuss in their briefs whether dismissal of
2

the

appeal

is

an

appropriate

circumstances of this case.

sanction

under

all

of

the

In that regard, the parties were

instructed to address the following sub-issues:
1.

Whether D'Aston actually requires a 30-day grace

period for contumacious litigants or whether it merely permits
such a grace period in the discretion of the appellate court;
2.

If a 30-day grace period is otherwise required,

whether it may be dispensed with in situations where it is
physically impossible for defendant to bring himself into
timely compliance with the Trial Court's Orders and process,
including in the situation of defendant's incarceration out of
state;
3. If incarceration out of State might in some instances
preclude dismissal and require instead a grace period longer
than 30 days, whether the result should be different in cases
where defendant had ample opportunity, pre-incarceration, to
discharge the contempt sanction pending against him.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 26, 1982, judgment was entered by the District
Court of Kane County in the sum of $987,200.00 in favor of the
plaintiff in the case of Richard A. Von Hake v. Harry Edward Thomas
and 1st National Credit Corporation.

The jury award included

amounts for both general and punitive damages.

That judgment was

affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1985 in a decision that is found
in 705 P.2d 766. Defendant was a resident of the State of Utah at
the time the original Judgment was entered by the Court.
2

Since Thomas failed to file a supersedeas bond in
connection with his appeal, no stay was granted and plaintiff went
forward with collection efforts while the appeal was pending.

In

1984, Thomas was found guilty by the Trial Court of criminal
contempt

for failing to produce certain tax returns he had

described in prior testimony and for his failure to appear at a
court hearing to show cause why he should not be found in contempt
of court. The judge sentenced him to serve thirty days in the Kane
County Jail as a punishment for that contempt.
Mr. Thomas appealed his conviction, and a stay of the
sentence was granted pending that appeal.

In 1988 the Supreme

Court reversed the civil judgment of contempt that had been entered
by the Trial Court.

However, the Supreme Court affirmed the

criminal contempt conviction and remanded the case to the District
Court for execution of the thirty-day sentence. See 759 P.2d 1162.
The lower court then issued a Bench Warrant instructing the Sheriff
of Kane County to arrest Mr. Thomas and carry out the sentence
imposed by the Court. Mr. Thomas has never voluntarily surrendered
himself to the Sheriff to serve that sentence, and the Sheriff has
never been able to arrest him in the State of Utah.

The sentence

has never been served.
There has never been any indication that Mr. Thomas is
interested in serving the sentence imposed upon him by the Court.
Court records show that copies of the original conviction for
contempt and the decision of the Supreme Court on Appeal were
forwarded to defendant's counsel immediately following their entry
3

by the respective courts involved.

In 1991, Mr, Thomas was

convicted of Tax Fraud in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, and he was sentenced to serve five years in the
Federal Penitentiary.

That sentence was stayed while he appealed

that conviction, but the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit recently affirmed the Trial Court's decision.

On

April 12, 1993, Mr. Thomas became a ward of the United States
Bureau of Prisons.

He

is now

incarcerated

in the Federal

Penitentiary at Boron, California, and his release date has been
set for July 10, 1996.
The action now before the Court was filed by the
plaintiff on December 31, 1990 to renew the Judgment entered
against the defendant on March 26, 1982. The Trial Court granted
Summary Judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without ruling on the
merits when it learned that defendant had failed to serve the
thirty-day sentence imposed upon him for contempt.

This decision

was based upon the ruling of the Court of Appeals in the case of
Piston v. Piston 790 P.2d 590.

Appellant now seeks by Writ of

Certiorari to have that dismissal reversed.
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was granted in part
by the Supreme Court, and the case was remanded to the Utah Court
of Appeals for further briefing by the parties on the question of
whether the dismissal of the appeal is an appropriate sanction
under

all of the circumstances of the case.
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This Brief will

address that issue and the sub-issues that were outlined by the
Court of Appeals in its Order of January 7, 1994.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The only facts that are relevant to the matter now before
the Court are as follows:
1. In 1984, Harry Edward Thomas was found guilty by the
Trial Court of criminal contempt for failing to produce certain tax
returns he had described in prior testimony and for his failure to
appear at a court hearing to show cause why he should not be found
in contempt of court for that violation.

The judge sentenced him

to serve thirty days in the Kane County Jail as punishment for that
contempt.
2. Mr. Thomas appealed the Judgment and sentence of the
Court, and the execution of the thirty-day jail sentence was stayed
pending that appeal.
3. In 1988, the Supreme Court of Utah reversed the civil
contempt conviction because the Trial Court had failed to enter
written findings of fact as required by prior State law.

But the

Court affirmed the criminal contempt conviction and remanded the
case to the District Court for execution of the thirty-day
sentence.

See 759 P.2d 1162.
4.

Notice of the conviction and sentence of the Trial

Court was forwarded to defendant's counsel after its entry by the
Court.

Notice of the affirmance of the contempt conviction and

sentence was also forwarded to counsel after it was entered by the
Utah Supreme Court.
5

5.

The Trial Court then issued a Bench Warrant and

instructed the Sheriff of Kane County to arrest the defendant and
carry out the sentence of the Court.
6. Mr. Thomas had five years prior to the present appeal
to produce himself voluntarily for service of the sentence imposed
by the Court.

He never did so.

7. Mr. Thomas moved to the State of Wyoming in 1984, and
he has avoided service of the Bench Warrant by the Sheriff of Kane
County for the full five-year period. There is no indication that
Mr. Thomas is interested in serving the sentence imposed upon him
by the Court.
8. Mr. Thomas became a ward of the United States Bureau
of Prisons on April 12, 1993, and he is now incarcerated in the
Federal Penitentiary at Boron, California, with a release date set
for July 10, 1996. He is presently unable to voluntarily present
himself to the Sheriff of Kane County to serve the sentence imposed
upon him in 1984 for Contempt of Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Since we are dealing with the appeal from a criminal
contempt conviction, the principles outlined by the D'Aston case
relating to civil contempt appeals does not apply to this case.
Under the cases discussed in the D'Aston case relating to the
appeal from criminal contempt convictions, we should follow the
principles enunciated in the Tuttle and Hardy cases.

These cases

make no provisions for a grace period to allow one convicted of
criminal contempt to bring himself into compliance with any Court
6

Orders before his appeal can go forward.

Since defendant is, in

effect, a fugitive from justice, the principles relating to
criminal contempt should be followed in this case. This means that
defendant's appeal should be dismissed until he has brought himself
into compliance with the Court's previous Orders and has served the
sentence imposed upon him by the Court.

After he has completed

these measures, he can ask the Court to reinstate his appeal. This
will properly avoid the complex measures that may be associated
with the dismissal of civil appeals pending his compliance with
previous Orders of the Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
DISMISSAL OF THE PRESENT APPEAL
WAS AN APPROPRIATE SANCTION TO BE IMPOSED
UPON THE DEFENDANT UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE
Throughout this entire appellate proceeding, the parties
and the Courts seem to have overlooked one pivotal factor that
governs the disposition of this entire matter. Although the Trial
Court apparently found Mr. Thomas guilty of both civil and criminal
contempt, the Supreme Court reversed the civil contempt judgment
and affirmed only the criminal contempt conviction.

For this

reason we are dealing with a criminal contempt proceeding.

The

parties should limit their discussion to principles dealing with
criminal contempt.

Discussions about statutes and precedents

relating to appeals from civil contempt orders are no longer
relevant to this matter.
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In the underlying case of D'Aston v. D'Aston. 790 P. 2d
590 (Utah App. 1990) the Court of Appeals discussed prior Utah
cases dealing with criminal contempt. The Court stated that in the
area of criminal appeals, the Utah Supreme Court has dismissed the
appeal of a prisoner after he escaped custody.
Tuttle. 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985).

See State v.

The Court also referred to

the case of Hardy v. Morris, 636 P.2d 473, 474, (Utah 1981), where
the Court dismissed an escapee's appeal from a dismissal of Writ of
Habeas Corpus.

In Hardy, the Court held further that a criminal

appeal that has been dismissed during the escapee's absence should
be reinstated when the defendant returns to custody.

In this way

the fundamental right to appellate review of a criminal conviction
is preserved by the reviewing court.

This means that under the

language of the D7Aston case the Court may dismiss a criminal
appeal when the appellant has escaped from the State's custody.
But when he returns to prison, either voluntarily or involuntarily,
his appeal should be reinstated.
In the matter now before the Court, Mr. Thomas is in the
same position as a prisoner who has escaped from custody.

Since a

Bench Warrant has been issued for his arrest, he is a fugitive from
justice.

He is subject to immediate arrest and confinement under

the conviction of contempt.

He is now subject to the same

treatment that was given to the defendant in the Tuttle case.
Until he is brought back into this jurisdiction and serves his
sentence, then his appeal should not be allowed. The appeal should
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now be dismissed, subject to having it reinstated after he has
returned to Utah to serve his sentence for contempt.
Respondent will now turn to a discussion of the subissues that were designated by the Court of Appeals in its Order of
January 7, 1994.
1.

Whether D'Aston actually requires a 30-day grace

period for contumacious litigants or whether it merely permits such
a grace period, in the discretion of the appellate court;
Since this matter involves only a criminal contempt
conviction, it appears that D'Aston does not require any grace
period before dismissing the case. The law governing this question
is found in the Tuttle and Hardy cases.

Neither of them even

discussed granting a grace period to allow the escaped felon to
race back to prison to preserve his appeal status. For those of us
who have had occasion to represent escaped felons, one statement
made by the Supreme Court in the Tuttle opinion appears to be
realistically humorous:
"The stated premise of Brady - that an escape
is an intentional abandonment of an appeal is founded upon a questionable assumption,
i.e., that one who escapes has actually made a
decision to abandon his appeal. A far more
reasonable assumption is that the escapee has
not even considered how his escape will affect
his appeal rights."
Most escaped felons are more concerned about how to stay
out of the custody of the authorities than how to get back into
such custody.

The pendency of an appeal doesn't seem to motivate

a rush back to prison gates.
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Even under civil contempt matters, the courts have
usually taken a sensible approach to such matters. Under the facts
of this case, it is doubtful that the D'Aston case would require
any grace period because such a period would have no reasonable
purpose. To give Mr. Thomas thirty or sixty or ninety days to rush
down to Kanab and serve his thirty-day sentence in order to
preserve his appeal rights would be an exercise in futility. Mr.
Thomas would have great difficulty convincing

federal prison

authorities that they should let him out for a brief "leave of
absence" to serve another sentence that has been pending against
him for five years. Such a request is more likely to be written up
in the humor column of the prison newspaper because of its
incredible nature.
The cases cited in D'Aston to support the granting of a
grace period seem to indicate that the grace period has been used
to correct or remedy an unacceptable situation that has arisen
because of the actions of the appellant.

On one hand, he refuses

to comply with the lawful Orders and Judgments of the Trial Court,
while he is availing himself of the powers of the Appellate Court
to obtain judicial review.

D'Aston itself is a good example of

this type of remedial action.

By adopting the grace period

approach, the Utah Supreme Court required Mrs. D'Aston to submit
herself to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court and satisfy that
Court's concerns before she could exercise a right of appeal.
held that she had the obligation to come

10

forward

It

and offer a

reasonable alternative to the Trial Court to safeguard her assets
pending her appeal.
Another example of this type of approach is found in the
Nevada Supreme Court case of Closset v. Closset, 71 Nev. 80, 280
P. 2d 290, (1955), where the appellant had failed to comply with the
Trial Court Order in a divorce proceeding and had been found in
contempt. The appeal was not immediately dismissed for failure to
comply with the Trial Court Judgment, but the Nevada Supreme Court
ruled that the appeal would be dismissed if the appellant failed to
submit herself to the process of the Trial Court or posted a
supersedeas bond within thirty days. The Nevada Court stated that
it would not permit the appellant to avail himself of judicial
review while at the same time placing himself beyond the reach of
the process of the Trial Court in defiance of his attempt to
enforce its judgment.

The Appellate Court insisted that one

seeking the aid of the Court should remain throughout the course of
such a proceeding amenable to all judicial process of the State
which may issue in connection with such a proceeding.
In the action now before the Court there is no need for
a grace period because no such corrective or remedial action is
necessary.

Mr. Thomas is a fugitive from justice where his Utah

conviction is concerned, but he is presently in no position to
correct or rectify his past actions. Even if Mr. Thomas was given
a reasonable option to come back to Utah and serve his sentence, he
couldn't possibly do so until 1996.

The Court would have to

suspend any action on his case until he is released from his
11

Federal Court prison sentence. A short grace period, such as that
awarded to the defendant in the D'Aston case would not solve any of
the problems raised in this case.

Only a lengthy suspension of

these proceedings would accomplish such a result. The approach of
the

Court

of

Appeals

in

D'Aston

simply

has

no

reasonable

application to the matter now before the Court.
2.

If a thirty-day grace period is otherwise required,

whether it may be dispensed with in situations where it is
physically impossible for defendant to bring himself into timely
compliance with the Trial Court's Orders and process, including in
the situation of defendant's incarceration out of state;
Assuming a thirty-day grace period is otherwise required,
the only reasonable approach in this case would be to dispense with
that period in the action now before the Court. This is necessary
because it is physically impossible for the defendant to bring
himself into timely compliance with the Trial Court's Order and
process.

He is now incarcerated out of state, and he will not be

available to bring himself into timely compliance until that
sentence has been completed.

It is ludicrous to require that this

entire proceeding should be placed on hold until he is released
from his prison sentence in 1996. The more reasonable approach is
the one set forth in the Tuttle case, which would allow him to have
his appeal reinstated when he has placed himself in compliance with
the Court Orders and has served his thirty-day sentence for
contempt.
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3. If incarceration out of State might in some instances
preclude dismissal and require instead a grace period longer than
30 days, whether the result should be different in cases where
defendant had ample opportunity, pre-incarceration, to discharge
the contempt sanction pending against him.
One salient point of fact should be noted and discussed
at the outset of this portion of the argument.

This is the fact

that Mr. Thomas brought on the dismissal of his appeal by his own
voluntary acts and omissions.

By his own actions, Mr. Thomas has

denied himself the right of appeal.

He did this by failing to

purge himself of the contempt of court that he committed some ten
years ago.

After the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and

sentence in 1988 and ordered the case remanded to the District
Court for execution of the thirty-day jail sentence, he had every
reasonable opportunity to comply with the sentence of the Court.
He could have turned himself in voluntarily, or he could have
waited for the Sheriff to serve him with appropriate process to
enforce the Judgment. Instead, for five years he actively avoided
the Sheriff's efforts to enforce the Order of the Court through
proper arrest procedures.

His actions show his ongoing disregard

for the judicial process.

The Court merely acted on his own non-

compliance with Court Orders to bring about the dismissal of his
appeal. He had ample opportunity to correct the situation, and he
never took the opportunity to do so.

For this reason alone, the

Court should give Mr. Thomas no further consideration on his
appeal. His case should be dismissed, subject to its reinstatement
13

at some future time when he has fully complied with the Orders and
Judgments of the Trial Court.
The basis for defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari
is that defendant is now physically incapable of bringing himself
into compliance with the judgment and sentence of the Trial Court
because he is incarcerated in the Federal Penitentiary for an
unrelated crime.

Defendant cites the Utah case of Bradshaw v.

Kershaw. 627 P. 2d 528 (1991) as supporting precedent for his
argument on the defense of impossibility of performance.

His

reliance on that case in this appeal is sorely misplaced.
A careful analysis of the Bradshaw case makes it clear
that defendant cannot use the impossibility defense to avoid having
his present appeal dismissed.

After discussing in great detail

Utah Statutes that provide three different sanctions for contempt,
the Court stated that, in any event, impossibility of performance
should never be a defense to the sanctions of punishment or
indemnification

if

the

ground

of

impossibility

traceable to the contemnor's own deliberate acts.

is

directly

In this case,

defendant wants to use the impossibility defense to excuse himself
from his own failure to subject himself to the Orders and sentence
of the Court.
The appellant also relies upon the case of Jeppson v.
Jeppson, 597 P.2d 1345 (Utah, 1979), to support his position on the
impossibility of performance defense.
solace to the appellant in this matter.

That case gives little
In Jeppson, the Utah

Supreme Court held that in cases where punishment is imposed for
14

future

contempt,

a

hearing

is

needed

to

determine

impossibility defense applies to such future contempt.

if

the

In the

matter now before the Court, the contempt of Mr. Thomas cannot be
classified as future contempt, and the circumstances are not
similar to those raised in the Jeppson case.

The contempt

committed by Mr. Thomas has already been adjudicated, and we are
merely seeking to enforce the punishment that was imposed by the
Court some five years ago. If the impossibility of performance was
a proper defense, it should have been asserted at the time that the
contempt was adjudicated by the Trial Court. The impossibility of
performance now asserted by the defendant is not a proper defense
to the dismissal of his appeal because it was never raised in any
prior proceeding. He is, again, too late to raise this defense.
CONCLUSION
Based on the matters set forth herein, the respondent
submits to the Court that under all the circumstances of this case,
dismissal of the appeal was an appropriate sanction, and that
sanction should be upheld by later ruling of this Court.
The fourteen year history of this case shows that Mr.
Thomas has no respect for the Orders of any Court.

He uses such

Orders to his advantage when possible, and then ignores them when
they do not suit his fancy.

By this means he has avoided payment

of a lawful judgment of the Court for over eleven years.

Now on

this appeal, Mr. Thomas continues to use his own indiscretions and
improper acts to excuse his failure to comply with the Orders of
the Court.

He now finds himself in the Federal Penitentiary
15

because of other unrelated felonies that he has committed.

He

alone put himself into a position where it is impossible for him to
comply with the previous sentence imposed by the Court.

He now

argues that his self-imposed impossibility to perform should excuse
him from the penalty of dismissal already imposed upon him by the
Court of Appeals.

He overlooks the fact that for over five years

he had no impediment to bring himself into compliance with the
lawful process of this State's judiciary, other than his own
refusal to do so.

His incarceration in California may make it

impossible for him to bring himself into immediate compliance with
the Court's Order, but he is five years late in making this
assertion. He has only been unable to comply since April 12, 1993,
when he entered the Federal Prison in California.

He had ample

opportunity prior to his imprisonment on Federal charges to make
his peace with the Sixth District Court, if he had any sincere
desire to do so.
A solution similar to that followed in the D'Aston case
is not practical in the present case.

Giving Mr. Thomas a grace

period to comply with his jail sentence and making that a condition
for going forward with the appeal is not appropriate because he
cannot possibly comply with any of those conditions until he has
been released from prison in California.

There is no reason to

postpone further action on this case until he is released from that
obligation.
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DATED t h i s ^

day of March, 1994.

H. RALPH |£LEMM
Attorney for Respondent
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I hereby certify that four true and

correct copies of

the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT were mailed, postage prepaid by
United States Mail, this

day of March, 1994 to the following

counsel:
SHAWN D. TURNER
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
1200 Kennecott Building
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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